Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78678
Authors: 
Larsson, Laura
Runeson, Caroline
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2007:8
Abstract: 
This paper looks at a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the benefit size structure as for some unemployed persons, benefits from the SI are higher than benefits from the UI. We use a reform of the SI system that came in force 1 July, 2003, to identify the effect of economic incentives arising from the different benefit sizes. Our results from a duration analysis show clearly that the higher the benefits, the larger the probability of reporting sick.
Subjects: 
Unemployment insurance
sickness insurance
health
duration analysis
discrete hazard models
JEL: 
C41
H55
I18
J64
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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