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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2006:15
Verlag: 
Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU), Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.
Schlagwörter: 
Disability insurance
experiment
policy evaluation
sickness absenteeism
self-screening
JEL: 
J26
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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