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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 13-048
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of the two basic effects of patenting: the positive effect of temporarily mitigating competition, and the negative effect of mandatory disclosure of a patent application. Providing empirical evidence for the presented theoretical results we find that (i) a technological lead and the propensity to patent are negatively related as opposed to common intuition, (ii) in industries with imperfect appropriability in case of secrecy the extent of the technological lead is positively associated with the propensity to patent, and that (iii) the intensity of patent protection mitigates the competitive threat a patentee faces.
Schlagwörter: 
patenting decision
disclosure requirement
patent scope
vertical product differentiation
IPC codes
JEL: 
L13
O14
O33
O34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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