Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78434
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 33/2001
Abstract: 
In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.
Subjects: 
effort effect
likelihood effect
risk taking
tournament
JEL: 
D23
J3
M12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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