Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78422
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Normann, Hans-Theo
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2001
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.
Subjects: 
Cournot markets
oligopolies
experiments
JEL: 
L13
C92
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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