Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78418 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 11/2000
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players learn a) the relevant features of the payoff structure of a 2x2 game (e.g. the best reply structure) and b) whether they play according to equilibrium predictions regardless of how question a) is being answered. Question a) is being tested by asking subjects to guess the payoff structure of their opponents in a repeated encounter and rewarding subjects for correct answers.
Schlagwörter: 
Learning
Subjective Games
Experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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