Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78416
Authors: 
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2001
Abstract: 
It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.
Subjects: 
cooperation
JEL: 
C72
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
257.17 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.