Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78409
Authors: 
Nöldeke, Georg
Samuelson, Larry
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 22/2001
Abstract: 
We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of males in lower quality (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium.
Subjects: 
sexual selection
handicap principle
signaling equilibrium
net viability
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.