Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78388
Authors: 
Mitra, Manipushpak
Hain, Roland
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 20/2001
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement simple sequencing problems in ex-post equilibrium. We show that a simple sequencing problem is implementable if and only if the mechanism is a `generalized VCG mechanism'. We then show that for implementable n agent simple sequencing problems, with polynomial cost function of order (n-2) or less, one can achieve first best implementability. Moreover, for the class of simple sequencing problems with ``sufficiently well behaved'' cost function, this is the only class of first best implementable simple sequencing problems.
Subjects: 
Simple Sequencing Problems
Ex-post Equilibrium
First Best Implementability
JEL: 
C44
C72
C78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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