Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78378 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 1/2001
Publisher: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Abstract: 
We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally distributed.
Subjects: 
insider trading
Kyle model
linear equilibrium
normal distribution
JEL: 
C62
D82
G14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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