Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78377
Authors: 
Abbink, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 1/2000
Abstract: 
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Subjects: 
Corruption
reciprocity
fairness
public sector salaries
JEL: 
C91
D62
D72
D73
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
182.88 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.