Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78373
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Normann, Hans-Theo
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 6/2000
Abstract: 
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
Subjects: 
learning
Cournot oligopoly
JEL: 
C72
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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