Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78362
Authors: 
Riechmann, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Hannover 260
Abstract: 
Evolutionary dynamics in games imply de-facto spiteful behavior of the players: In order to 'survive' the evolutionary process, players must perform better than their opponents. This means they maximize relative rather than absolute payoffs. The paper shows that there is a class of games resulting in different equilibria if played by maximizers of absolute or of relative pay-offs, respectively. It is demonstrated that evolutionary equilibria (general ESS) can be found by formally maximizing relative payoffs. This method is analytically deduced and demonstrated at the examples of four well known games: the Cournot oligopoly game, the public goods game, the Tullock game of rent seeking and the Van Huyck et al. (1990) coordination game.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary Equilibrium
Spiteful Behavior
Relative Payoff
JEL: 
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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