Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78263
Authors: 
Rauscher, Michael
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 13
Abstract: 
The paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and, thus, helps to tame Leviathan governments. However, this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government. In the case of benefit taxes, e.g. user charges, a Leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum-sum taxes.
JEL: 
F20
H21
H40
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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