Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78219
Authors: 
Backhaus, Jürgen G.
Year of Publication: 
1979
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik der Universität Konstanz 120
Abstract: 
The objective of this note.is to discuss optimal enforcement strategies vis-a-vis organized and unorganized crime. Taking an earlier contribution by Buchanan as a starting point of the analysis, it is argued that his proposal to monopolize crime in order to reduce the general level of criminal activity is a questionable strategy to curb crime. Syndicated crime is likely to benefit from economies of scale in the provision of non-governmental enforcement of agreements and contracts. The consequent reduction in costs is likely to increase the general level of criminal activity. Nevertheless, the price-theoretic argument is seen as an interesting starting point for the design of new strategies to combat crime.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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