Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77977
Authors: 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Bruegel Working Paper 2010/03
Abstract: 
This paper develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in different patent offices. Quality is defined as the extent to which patent offices comply with their patentability conditions in a transparent way. The methodology consists of a two-layer analytical framework encompassing 'legal standards' and their 'operational design', which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process. The comparison of patent offices in Europe (EPO), Japan (JPO) and the US (USPTO) shows that their operational designs differ substantially: the EPO provides higher-quality and more expensive services than the USPTO, while the JPO is in an intermediate position. These results illustrate that different system designs lead to different outcomes in terms of backlogs, patent propensity and the number of dubious patent rights in force. In this respect, these findings: 1) provide an empirical validation of Jaffe and Lerner's (2004) conjecture of a vicious cycle linking the quality of examination and demand for patents; and 2) highlight the need for a multi-faceted convergence of patent systems before mutual recognition is put in place.
Subjects: 
patent system
quality
patent propensity
intellectual property
JEL: 
O30
O31
O34
O38
O57
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
409.57 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.