Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77802
Authors: 
Bru, Lluís
Faulí-Oller, Ramon
Sandonís, Joel
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 2 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 217-231
Abstract: 
We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist to a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of our approach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly. As a consequence, partial price discrimination arises in equilibrium; in particular,we showthat inefficient downstream firms receive personalized prices whereas efficient firms are charged a uniform price. The extreme cases of complete price discrimination and uniform price arise in our setting as particular cases, depending on the cost of customizing prices.
Subjects: 
price discrimination
input markets
JEL: 
D4
L11
L12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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