Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77770 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 485-496
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
Schlagwörter: 
strategy-proof voting
continuum of voters
multidimensional policy space
elliptic preferences
JEL: 
D71
D72
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