Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77762
Authors: 
Dreze, Jacques H.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 3 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 1/2 [Pages:] 259-271
Abstract: 
The theory of games against nature relies on complete preferences among all conceivable acts (case 1). Aumann and Drèze (Am Econ J Microecon 1(1):116,(2009) consider situations where preferences are defined only for a given set of acts (case 2).We extend these results to situations where (i) only the set of optimal elements from a given set of acts is known (case 3); (ii) only a single optimal act is known (case 4). To these four cases correspond four nested sets of admissible subjective probabilities. Cases 3 and 4 define the extent to which probabilities must be specified to solve a decision problem.
Subjects: 
games
decisions
probability
elicitation
JEL: 
D81
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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