Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77752 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 305-323
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
health plans competition
adverse selection
differentiation
JEL: 
D82
I11
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
305.37 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.