Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77752
Authors: 
Olivella, Pau
Vera-Hernandez, Marcos
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 305-323
Abstract: 
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Subjects: 
health plans competition
adverse selection
differentiation
JEL: 
D82
I11
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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