Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77748
Authors: 
Gómez-Rúa, María
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 137-153
Abstract: 
n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.
Subjects: 
cost sharing
pollutant-cleaning cost
water taxes
JEL: 
C71
D61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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