Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77740
Authors: 
Fernández-Ruiz, Jorge
García-Cestona, Miguel
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 235-245
Abstract: 
In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77-99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks' profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in which adverse selection is not too strong.We analyze the complementary case and show that, when the economy suffers from strong adverse selection, information sharing still increases banks' profits, but it may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs.
Subjects: 
information sharing
lending relationships
poaching
equilibrium switching
JEL: 
G21
L15
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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