Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77739 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 1/2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 1-14
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
A high court has to decide whether a lawis constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be singlepeaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.
Schlagwörter: 
runoff voting system
Condorcet consistency
strategy-proofness
implementation theory
JEL: 
C72
D71
D78
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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