Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77650 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4272
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Most theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality central banks play complex, long horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these issues in a simple infinite horizon game with a novel tradeoff: higher rates deter financial imbalances, but lower rates reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The central bank's welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. Generally, independent central banks cannot attain both low inflation and financial stability.
Schlagwörter: 
central bank
correlation-indexed security
discipline effect
stability effect
JEL: 
E50
G21
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.