Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77586 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 66
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility results such as the one by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) are turned into possibility results. Second, we provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of kindness sensations. Finally, we turn to an environment without common knowledge of social preferences and introduce the notion of a psychologically robust mechanism. Such a mechanism can be implemented without information about the type or the intensity of social preferences. We show that the mechanisms which have been the focus of the conventional mechanism design literature can be modified to achieve psychological robustness.
Schlagwörter: 
Mechanism Design
Psychological Games
Social Preferences
Intentions
Reciprocity
Revelation Principle
JEL: 
C70
C72
D02
D03
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
805.31 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.