Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77562
Authors: 
Goeree, Jacob K.
Kushnir, Alexey
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Zurich 21
Abstract: 
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents. We demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of our approach with several examples. Finally, we show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation breaks down when utilities are non-linear or when values are interdependent, multi-dimensional, or correlated.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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