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Autoren: 
Ferrer-Alós, Carlos
Netzer, Nick
Datum: 
2012
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper 63
Zusammenfassung: 
A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular N-player binary-action games. For the mistakes model, robust selection results obtain for best-reply dynamics in the same class of games under the weaker condition of strategic complementarity. Further, both the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation are robust.
Schlagwörter: 
learning in games
stochastic stability
radius-coradius theorems
logit-response dynamics
mutations
imitation
JEL: 
C72
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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