Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77497
Authors: 
Kiedaisch, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Zurich 78
Abstract: 
This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a qualityladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting nonexpiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a nonobviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate.
Subjects: 
intellectual property rights
persistent leadership
cumulative innovation
preemption
forward protection
non-obviousness requirement
patent policy
JEL: 
L40
O31
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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