Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77484 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 121
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that the optimal framework is a floor system if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is optimal to operate a channel system.
Schlagwörter: 
monetary policy
floor system
channel system
standing facilities
JEL: 
E52
E58
E59
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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