Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77478
Authors: 
Hefti, Andreas M.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Zurich 112
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze R&D collaboration networks in industries where firms are competitors in the product market. Firms' benefits from collaborations arise by sharing knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. By forming collaborations, however, firms also change their own competitive position in the market as well as the overall market structure. We analyze incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations with other firms and the implications of these alliance decisions for the overall network structure. We provide a general characterization of both equilibrium networks and endogenous production choices, and compare it to the efficient network architecture. We also allow for firms to differ in their technological characteristics, investigate how this affects their propensity to collaborate and study the resulting network architecture.
Subjects: 
Contraction mapping
Stability
Uniqueness
Aggregate-taking behavior
Dominance solvability
Symmetric games
JEL: 
C72
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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