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Autoren: 
Almer, Christian
Winkler, Ralph
Datum: 
2010
Reihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers 10-14
Zusammenfassung: 
We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate Change
Generalized Response Models
International Environmental Agreements
Kyoto Protocol
JEL: 
Q54
F53
C25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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