Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76742
Authors: 
Almer, Christian
Winkler, Ralph
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Universität Bern 10-14
Abstract: 
We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.
Subjects: 
Climate Change
Generalized Response Models
International Environmental Agreements
Kyoto Protocol
JEL: 
Q54
F53
C25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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