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von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas
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CESifo Working Paper No. 1067
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
In this paper we briefly summarise the results of our studies of the property insurance market in 5 countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland and Germany. We then draw conclusions, how the market for insurance against natural disasters (such as floods or subsidence) should be institutionally organised. Both for reasons of efficiency (lower administrative and sales costs) and to reduce the scope of risk selection, public monopolies should play an important role on this market. A further major advantage of the monopoly solution is the fact, that public insurers have a strong incentive to actively participate in prevention.
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Working Paper

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