Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76620 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1029
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful codecision makers', understanding of the final stage of the procedure - bargaining in the Conciliation Committee - is crucial. Here, EP and CM are assumed to have spatial preferences determined by their respective internal decision mechanisms. Applying bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although institutionally the Council and the Parliament are seemingly in a symmetric position, CM has significantly greater influence on EU legislation.
Schlagwörter: 
European Union codecision procedure
Conciliation Committee
bargaining
spatial voting
decision procedures
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
950.42 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.