Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76587
Authors: 
Berger, Helge
de Haan, Jakob
Inklaar, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1084
Abstract: 
Soon, euro area membership could more than double, with the vast majority of accession countries being quite different in economic terms compared with current members. Under the current decision-making system, this can lead to high decisionmaking costs and there is a risk that monetary policy could deviate from the targets specified in the Maastricht treaty. While centralization might be a “first-best” solution to these problems in many ways, there are possible disadvantages from a political economy perspective, including a potential conflict with the established voting rights of current euro area member countries. An alternative solution to ensure the European perspective of decision-making in the ECB Council is to match economic size and voting power. One way to implement this principle is a rotation scheme for national central bank governors that takes economic differences between the member countries into account. The paper discusses various rotation schemes, also with a view to the decision-making cost argument.
Subjects: 
European Central Bank
centralization of monetary policy
EMU
transition countries
accession countries
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.