Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76563
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Kanniainen, Vesa
Poutvaara, Panu
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1075
Abstract: 
We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogeneous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear.
Subjects: 
taxes
land rents
property values
migration
redistribution
JEL: 
H21
H70
R21
R23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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