Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76553
Authors: 
Bargain, Olivier
Moreau, Nicolas
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1052
Abstract: 
The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the withinhousehold distributional effect of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are entirely driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the collective model would be required if the tax reform was both radical and of extended scope.
Subjects: 
collective model
intrahousehold allocation
household labor supply
tax reform
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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