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Berger, Helge
Hefeker, Carsten
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1165
The pending enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought to the fore the discussion of the voting right distribution in the European Central Bank (ECB) council. We show that, in a model where labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage setting, deviating from a voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial. Preliminary evidence on unemployment and voting rights in the ECB council seems broadly in line with this idea. We also point to possible policy implications for EMU enlargement and ECB restructuring.
monetary policy
wage setting
European Monetary Union
European Central Bank
euro area
ECB reform
EMU enlargement
accession countries
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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