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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1196
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a simultaneous move game of targeted advertising and pricing in a market with various consumer segments. In this setting we explore the implications of market segmentation on firm competitiveness. If firms are unable to target their ads on different consumer segments, a unique zero-profit equilibrium exists. By contrast, if firms employ targeted advertising, they can obtain positive profits. In equilibrium firms price very aggressively when they address the most profitable segment, quite gently when they target their ads on the least profitable segment and moderately aggressive when they advertise in the entire market.
Schlagwörter: 
segmentation
targeted advertising
oligopoly
price dispersion
price discrimination
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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