Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76423
Authors: 
Panteghini, Paolo
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 929
Abstract: 
This paper uses the Bad News Principle to study how the ability of multinationals to shift profits by transfer pricing affects both the timing of foreign direct investment decisions and government tax policy. A main finding of the paper is that if countries compete to attract foreign direct investments, only weak conditions are needed to establish that welfare is higher when firms can postpone irreversible investments as opposed to when they cannot.
Subjects: 
corporate taxation
irreversibility
MNE
real options and uncertainty
JEL: 
H25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.