Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76332
Authors: 
Fredriksson, Peter
Holmlund, Bertil
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 922
Abstract: 
This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.
Subjects: 
unemployment insurance
search
monitoring
sanctions
workfare
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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