Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76330 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 873
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest to insure themselves against future 'risk-class' classification. Accordingly, the First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot provide such transfers if insurance firms are unable to precommit their customers. On the other hand, public insurance plans that do not distinguish between 'risk-class' realizations are also inefficient. It is impossible, a-priori, to rank these alternatives from a welfare point of view.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
335.24 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.