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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 889
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair, that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits ('Delayed Retirement Credit' - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than actuarially fair.
Schlagwörter: 
delayed retirement credit
self-selection
moral hazard
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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