Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76292
Authors: 
Katsimi, Margarita
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 955
Abstract: 
This paper considers the optimal level of firm-specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm-specific training. Firm-specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm-specific training can decrease current wages as it implies a credible commitment to lower future labour turnover.
Subjects: 
efficiency wages
firm-specific training
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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