Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76221
Authors: 
Buehler, Stefan
Schmutzler, Armin
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich 0501
Abstract: 
We aim to clarify the role of access charges under two-way network competition, employing a reduced-form approach. Retaining the key features of specific network competition models but imposing less structure, we analyze the impact of changes in access charges on linear and non-linear retail prices. We derive sufficient conditions for usage fees to be increasing (and subscriber charges to be decreasing) in access charges. These conditions are shown to be satisfied only under rather restrictive assumptions on the demand for calls, suggesting that implementing collusion by inflating access charges is likely to be nonfeasible.
Subjects: 
network competition
two-way access
collusion
nonlinear retail prices
JEL: 
D43
L43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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