Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76214 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 0301
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental Regulation
Pollution Standards
Interest Groups
Lobbying
Policy Making
JEL: 
D72
D78
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
559.13 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.