Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76214
Authors: 
Polk, Andreas
Schmutzler, Armin
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich 0301
Abstract: 
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.
Subjects: 
Environmental Regulation
Pollution Standards
Interest Groups
Lobbying
Policy Making
JEL: 
D72
D78
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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