Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76152 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 0410
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Abstract: 
Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are a uniform package of benefits and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a welfare loss if preferences differ. This suggests introducing more contracted choice; however, it is widely believed that this would not benefit the aged. This study examines the relationship between age and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for additional options in Swiss social health insurance. Through discrete choice experiments (DCE), a marked diversity of preferences can be established. The findings suggest that while the aged do exhibit more status quo bias, they require less rather than more specific compensation for selected cutbacks considered, pointing to potential for contracts that induce self-rationing in return for lower premiums.
Subjects: 
willingness-to-pay
health insurance
age
rationing
JEL: 
C35
C93
D61
I11
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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