Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76143 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 0214
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is suffciently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
general training
human capital
oligopoly
turnover
JEL: 
D42
L22
L43
L92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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